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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WOODLAND THEATRES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ABC INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES, 
INC., a corporation, and 
PLITT INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
Case No. 14440 
Case No. 14441 
The plaintiff-appellant Woodland Theatres, Inc., 
(hereinafter "Woodland") hereby appeals from the trial court's 
Order of Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant-respondent 
Plitt Intermountain Theatres, Inc., (hereinafter "Plitt") in 
separate actions filed by Woodland for unlawful detainer and 
for breach of lease and termination of leasehold. 
On or about March 9, 1971, the plaintiff-appellant 
Woodland entered into a lease agreement with ABC Intermountain 
Theatres, Inc., (hereinafter "ABC"). ABC leased real 
property commonly known and referred to as the Woodland Drive-In 
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Theatre from Woodland for a period of fifteen (15) years. 
By the terms of the lease agreement, ABC covenanted to keep 
the theatre premises in good repair and to make certain 
improvements to the physical plant of the theatre. ABC 
further covenanted not to assign the leasehold without 
securing written permission from the lessor. The lease pro-
vided for a fixed monthly rental plus percentages of the gross 
gate receirts and concession sales above certain amounts. 
ABC flagrantly and repeatedly breached the lease 
agreement by assigning the leasehold without Woodland's 
authorization, by allowing the theatre premises to deteriorate 
physically and by not making the improvements to the physical 
plant of the theatre clearly required by the lease terms. 
ABC and Plitt did not run the Woodland Drive-In Theatre 
business in good faith, and consequently, Woodland received 
negligible amounts under the percentage rental provisions of 
the lease agreement. In light of ABC's breaches and lack of 
good faith performance of the lease agreement, Woodland filed 
two actions: one under the Utah unlawful detainer statute, 
U.C.A. § 78-36-3; and one for breach of the lease and termination 
of the leasehold. 
On December 12, 1975, ABC's assignee Plitt moved for 
summary judgment in both actions on the ground that Woodland 
had waived any and all claims for breaches, violations and 
-2-
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forfeitures under the lease agreement by accepting rent, 
and that as a matter of law Woodland had no claim for 
damages under the percentage rental provisions of the lease. 
The trial court granted defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Whereupon Woodland brought this appeal. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Did the trial court err in holding that as a 
matter of law Woodland waived the defendants-respondents' 
forfeiture of the leasehold by accepting rental payments? 
II. Did the trial court err in holding that as a 
matter of law Woodland waived all of the defendants-respondents' 
breaches of the lease agreement by accepting rental payments? 
III. Did the trial court err in holding that as a 
matter of law there was no implied covenant on the part of 
the defendants-respondents to operate the Woodland Drive-In 
Theatre in good faith so that Woodland could receive the full 
benefit of performance under the lease agreement? 
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
After the complaints in these actions had been filed 
and before completion of discovery, the defendant-respondent 
-3-
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Plitt moved, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for summary judgment in both actions and for a 
consolidated hearing of its motions. Woodland responded with 
a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to Plitt's 
motions for summary judgment. The hearing on the motions, 
consolidated pursuant to stipulation of counsel for the 
parties, was held on December 12, 1975. At the close of the 
hearlng, ~.he court granted Plitt's motion for summary judgment 
regardlng Woodland's claims of forfeiture of the leasehold 
and breaches of the lease agreement arising from alleged 
failures to repair, maintain and improve the physical plant 
of the Woodland Drive-In Theatre. The plaintiff-appellant 
Woodland files this brief seeking to reverse the trial court's 
summary judgment rulings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Lease Agreement and Its Provisions. 
On or about March 9, 1971, the plaintiff-appellant 
Woodland entered into a lease agreement with the defendant 
ABC. (A copy of the lease agreement is attached as Exhibit A.) 
Woodland Theatres, Inc., is a Utah corporation owning real 
property known as the Woodland Drive-In Theatre, located at 
4005 South, 700 East, Salt Lake County, Utah. According to the 
-4-
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provisions of the lease agreement, Woodland leased the 
Woodland Drive-In Theatre to ABC for a fifteen (15) year 
term, with an option to renew the lease for an additional five 
(5) years. (See Exhibit A, Paragraphs 1 and 20.) 
ABC agreed to pay a fixed annual rental of $32,500.00 
in equal monthly installments throughout the term of the 
lease. in addition, ABC covenanted to pay an annual percentage 
rental of fifteen percent (15%) of the gross admission receipts 
above $183,333.00 and fifteen percent (15%) of the gross 
concession receipts in excess of $65,000.00. The lease 
provided that ABC's records of gross admission and concession 
receipts would be open for Woodland's inspection during regular 
business hours. (See Exhibit A, Paragraph 2.) 
Respecting maintenance, ABC covenanted, inter alia, 
to keep the theatre premises in good repair, replacing worn 
out or damaged equipment at its own expense. (See Exhibit A, 
Paragraph 8.) ABC further agreed to make improvements to the 
theatre premises, including enlarging the snack bar to 
approximately double its initial size, oiling and spreading 
a layer of rock chips on the theatre grounds, resurfacing 
portions of the theatre premises and repainting the theatre 
screen. (See Exhibit A, Paragraphs 7, 25, 28.) ABC also 
covenanted not to assign the leasehold without obtaining 
Woodland's written permission, not to be unreasonably withheld. 
!See Exhiblt A, Paragraph 11.) 
-5-
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B. The Defendants-Respondents' Performance Under 
The Lease. 
ABC only operated the Woodland Drive-In Theatre 
until the beginning of the year, 1974. At that time, ABC 
assigned the lease to a successor corporation, Plitt Inter-
mountain Theatres, Inc., and Plitt and its employees took over 
the management of the theatre without any notice being given 
to Woodland. The substitution of Plitt for ABC constituted 
an unauthorized transfer of the leasehold in clear violation 
of the express terms of Paragraph 11 of the lease agreement 
providing that "[t]he Lessee [ABC] covenants and agrees that 
it will not assign this lease or enter into any sublease of 
the premises or any part thereof, without the written consent 
of the Lessor •.. .. (See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 
Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 2.) 
Neither Plitt nor ABC have adequately maintained 
the physical plant of the theatre, and it has deteriorated both 
visually and operationally over time. On an inspection of 
the theatre premises on June 24, 1974, Woodland found the 
theatre grounds strewn with papers and other garbage, the 
fence leaning and broken down in places, and water running througt 
part of the theatre from a broken sprinkler connection. 
Several speaker posts were broken, the screen tower paint 
was peeling and the screen was bare in places. The snack bar 
-6-
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addition was blocked off from the operating portion of the 
concession area by a cinder block wall, and the electrical 
system of the theatre was partially burned out, with auxiliary 
ground cables running to the back of the snack bar supplying 
power. (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Interrogatories, 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 4.) 
At a further inspection at the theatre on July 26, 
1974, employees of Woodland observed the west and north 
driveways of the theatre broken and pitted in places, the theatre 
screen stained with rust and its paint peeling, several 
speaker posts broken down and many water connections broken. 
Many of the bubble lights at the entrance to the theatre 
were broken or removed, the fence was weathered and unpainted, 
and many speakers previously removed were unreplaced. At that 
time, the broken sprinkler, noted before, remained unrepaired, 
and some of the wiring through the theatre was still not 
functioning. (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Interroga-
tories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 4.) The plaintiff-appellant's 
representatives inspected the theatre again on July 31, 1974 
and found that the deteriorating conditions observed on 
July 26 had not been corrected. In addition, they found that 
there were peeling paint and standing water within the oper-
ating snack bar, and the surface of the theatre was in need of 
an application of oil and rock chips. The fence was patched 
-7-
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with odd pieces of wood and propped up by two-by-fours in 
places, and two large wires taped to an open junction box 
were exposed, with a large "Danger" sign painted near 
them. Seventy (70) speakers were totally inoperable, and 
forty-seven (47) more gave poor sound. (Plaintiff's 
Response to Defendant's Interrogatories, Answer to Inter-
rogatory No. 4.) 
By allowing the physical plant of the Woodland 
Drive-In Theatre to deteriorate to a great extent, ABC and 
Plitt undermined the business of the theatre. The facilities 
that they provided were inadequate to accommodate the 
theatre's patrons. For example, on or about June 24, 1975, 
Eugene Woodland was contacted by Kenny Lloyd, local branch 
manager for Twentieth Century Fox. Mr. Lloyd reported that 
during a showing of a Fox film at the Woodland Drive-In 
Theatre, only 518 speakers were operational, and the theatre 
was turning away hundreds of patrons due to the unavailability 
of operable speakers. (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 
Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 4.) 
ABC had covenanted in the lease agreement to enlarge 
the snack bar to approximately double its size at the inception 
of the agreement within six (6) months of the effective date 
of the lease. (See Exhibit A, Paragraph 7.) An addition to 
the snack bar was constructed., but until August of 1975 it was 
-H-
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blocked off from the operating portion of the snack bar and 
used solely for storage. (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 
Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 5.) Projected 
increases in concession sales were thus stifled by the 
defendants-respondents' lack of good faith in implementing 
the provisions of the lease agreement mandating an addition 
to the snack bar. 
c. woodland's Suits 
Woodland filed its action against ABC and Plitt for 
unlawful detainer on August 21, 1974 and its action for breach 
of the lease and termination of the leasehold on September 24, 
1974. Prior to those filings, a notice of default and notice to 
quit the Woodland Drive-In Theatre premises were served on ABC 
and Plitt on August 2, 1974, and from that date, Woodland did 
not accept rental payments for subsequent periods of the 
defendants-respondents' occupancy of the theatre premises. 
(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-7.) 
Negotiations aimed at settling the differences 
between woodland and the defendants-respondents were conducted 
by counsel for the parties, and a tentative agreement was 
reached in December, 1974. Assuming that the settlement would 
be ratified by the defendants-respondents, Woodland accepted 
rental payments soon thereafter as a good faith gesture, 
-9-
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fully intending to continue its actions if the settle-
ment should fall through. When the terms of the negotiated 
settlement were repudiated by the defendants-respondents, 
Woodland continued with the prosecution of its lawsuits. 
(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defen-
dant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7.) 
The defendant-respondent Plitt subsequently moved 
for summary judgment in both of Woodland's actions on the ground 
that by accepting rental payments, Woodland thereby waived all 
of Plitt's and ABC's breaches of the lease agreement. Plitt 
also argued that as a matter of law there was no implied 
obligation under the lease agreement to make payments under 
its percentage rental provisions, introducing no factual 
evidence in support of its argument. The trial court granted 
summary judgment in Plitt's favor on Woodland's claims of 
forfeiture of the leasehold and breaches of the lease agreement 
through failure to repair, maintain and improve the theatre 
premises. However, its rulings were based solely on the 
flat, legal propositions advanced by the defendants-respondents, 
and it made no factual determinations relating to Woodland's 
claims. Woodland appeals to this Court to reverse the trial 
court's holdings and reinstate its actions for unlawful 
detainer and breach of the lease and termination of the lease-
hold. 
-10-
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ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred in finding that as a 
matter of law, Woodland waived the defendants-respondents' 
forfeiture of the leasehold and breaches of the lease agree-
ment by accepting rent. Initially it should be noted that 
defendants' motion for summary judgment was based solely 
upon the fact that plaintiff had accepted rent. Defendant 
did not assert or show that as a matter of uncontroverted 
fact, plaintiff had expressed or demonstrated an intent to 
waive its claims of forfeiture. The defendant did not assert 
or show that as a matter of uncontroverted fact the plaintiff 
had undertaken activities which clearly constituted a waiver 
of its claims of forfeiture. The defendant relied solely 
on the proposition that the acceptance of rent by a landlord 
as a matter of law, and without regard to the attendant 
factual circumstances, waives all past claims of forfeiture 
and breach. That proposition is clearly erroneous and the 
Court's acceptance thereof in its order of summary judgment 
is improper and should be reversed. 
A. woodland did not waive the defendants-respondents' 
forfeiture of the leasehold by accepting rent. waiver is 
uniformly recognized as the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. See Lucas Hunt Village Co. v. Klein, 218 S.W. 
-11-
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2d 595~ 599 (Mo. 1949). In the disposition of a claim of 
waiver, it is the intention of the party charged with making 
the waiver which is controlling. See Brazeal v. Bokelman, 
270 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 1959); In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, 
Inc., 95 F.2d 306, 309 (2d Cir. 1938). 
Accordingly, a determination of whether a landlord 
has waived a right or claim of forfeiture to a leasehold is 
a factual question concerning the intentional relinguishment 
by the Lindlord. Concerning the showing which must be made 
in order to establish a waiver, the Missouri Supreme Court 
in Lucas Hunt Village Co. v. Klein, 218 S.W.2d 595, 599 (Mo. 1949: 
unauthorized subletting, affirmed the rule that: 
[T]he intention of the party charged with 
making the waiver is controlling, and if not 
shown by express declaration, but implied by 
conduct, there must be a clear, unequivocal and 
decisive act of the party showing such purpose, 
and so manifestly consistent with and indicative 
of an intention to waive that no other reasonable 
explanation is possible. Lucas Hunt Village Co. 
v. Kelin, 218 S.W.2d 595, 599 (Mo. 1949). 
See also B.J.M. Realty Corp. v. Ruggieri, 326 F.2d 281, 284 
(2d Cir. 1963); Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943, 947 (8th 
-12-
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Cir. 1959); In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 95 F.2d 306, 
309 (2d Cir. 1938); Miller v. Reidy, 260 P. 358, 360 (Cal. 
1927). 
In suits involving a claim of forfeiture of a 
leasehold, courts have been unwilling to find claims of 
forfeiture or breach waived by the mere acceptance of rent 
in circumstances in which the landlord had evidenced a 
contrary intent. In that regard courts have recognized the 
institution of litigation against a tenant as a clear 
indication that the landlord has elected and is pursuing its 
right of forfeiture despite the fact that rental payments 
are made in the interim. 
For example, in the case of Fogel v. Hogan, 496 
P.2d 322, 324 (Colo. 1972), defendants filed a cross claim 
to terminate a lease, asserting as a basis therefore that the 
premises had not been maintained as provided in the lease. 
The tenant argued that the landlord had waived its claims of 
breach by accepting rental payments during the pendency of 
the action. The Colorado Supreme Court of Appeals, however, 
held that: 
. . . when a tenant continues in possession 
pending a determination of an action brought 
by the landlord to enforce a forfeiture, 
the tenant is under an obligation to pay 
rent and acceptance of these payments does 
not constitute waiver of the breach. 
(496 P.2d at 324.) 
-13-
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Similarly, in Merkowitz v. Mahoney, 215 P.2d 317 
{Colo. 1949), a landlord brought suit to repossess a leasehold 
charging that the tenant had operated the premises in violation 
of the law and in breach of the lease. The tenant argued 
that the landlord's acceptance of rent during the pendency 
of the action constituted a waiver of its claims of forfeiture. 
Rejecting the tenant's argument, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
stated: 
Where the landlord upon breach of a covenant 
gives notice of forfeiture and brings an action 
for possession, his suit presumably constitutes 
a final election to terminate the lease. The 
lease being terminated, the landlord is entitled 
to possession, and neither the landlord nor tenant 
is further bound by provisions of the lease as to 
the remainder of its term. However, where the 
right of the landlord to forfeit the term is disputed 
by the tenant and he continues in possession 
pending a determination of the action brought 
by the landlord to enforce a forfeiture, the 
tenant is under obligation of payment to the 
landlord for his possession. {Id.at 320.) 
The court held that although a landlord could agree 
during the pendency of litigation to accept back rent and 
terminate litigation, a determination of whether payments 
accepted during litigation were pursuant to such an agreement 
would have to be made from the circumstances of the case. 
{215 P.2d at 321.) The court, however, clearly held that the 
receipt of rental does not necessarily constitute waiver. In 
that regard, the court adopted the reasoning expressed in 
-14-
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Myers v. Herskowitz, 165 P. 1031, 1033 (Cal. 1917), quoting 
that decision as follows: 
The tenant having succeeded in retaining pos-
session of the premises during the pendency 
of the action, plaintiff was entitled to compen-
sation therefor, and after the benefit had · 
been received by the defendant the nlaintiff 
might reasonably accept such comoensation to 
which he was entitled without being held to 
have waived the right of action which he was 
then prosecuting. 
See also Fogel v. Hogan, 496 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1972); Wecht v. 
Anderson, 444 P.2d 501, 505 (Nev. 1968). 
In this case the clear intent expressed and demon-
strated at all times by the plaintiff-appellant was to fully 
litigate its claims of forfeiture. At no time did Woodland 
express or imply that its claims for forfeiture or breach 
would be dropped absent a full settlement with defendants-
respondents, nor has it by its course of action given any 
indication to that effect. In this regard, it is important 
to note that defendants-respondents made no claim whatsoever 
that plaintiff-appellant led them to believe it was waiving 
its claims of forfeiture. Defendants-respondents did not 
assert that they held that belief in reliance upon any actions 
of the plaintiff-appellant. On the contrary, defendants-
respondents rely solely on the fact that Woodland accepted 
the rent for defendants'respondents' possession of its 
property during the pendency of the actions to defeat 
-15-
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Woodland's claims. Such a superficial analysis cannot support 
summary judgment, particularly in the absence of any factual 
determinations whatsoever. The trial court's order of 
summary judgment should be reversed and Woodland's claims 
of forfeiture of the leasehold reinstated. 
B. Woodland did not waive the defendants-respondents' 
breaches of the lease agreement by accepting rent. The 
princlple that a clearly demonstrated intent is essential to 
a finding of waiver applies with even greater force to 
substantive breaches of the lease agreement than to the for-
feitures discussed in the preceding section. A lessor does 
not forfeit all rights to enforce the terms of a lease 
agreement by accepting rental payments. Nevertheless, defen-
dants based their motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that acceptance of rent by a landlord with knowledge of 
breaches of the lease agreement, without more, waives those 
breaches as a matter of law, and its motion was granted by 
the trial court. 
To the contrary, courts have held that material 
breaches of a lease agreement are not waived by the acceptance 
of rent. See Atkinson v. Trehan, 334 N. Y .s. 2d 293 (1~72); 
Wecht v. Anderson, 444 P.2d 501, 504-05 (Nev. 1968); Klein 
v. Longo, 34 A.2d 359, 360 (Mun. Ct. of Appeals, 
-16-
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D.C. 1943). In the Wecht case, the lessee had covenanted 
to construct a fifty (50) ton capacity retort for refining 
mercury on mineral-rich land by a certain date and never 
fulfilled that obligation. In the meantime, the lessor 
continued to accept rent but ultimately sought to terminate 
the lease on the basis of the lessee's breach in not 
building the retort. The court ruled that the lessor had not 
waived the lessee's breach by accepting rental payments 
with knowledge of the breach. 
In Fogel v. Hogan, 496 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1972), the 
lessee failed adequately to maintain the leased premises and 
thus breached the maintenance provision of the lease agree-
ment. Id. at 324. In a suit filed by the lessee against the 
lessors, the lessors filed a cross-claim for termination of 
the leasehold and continued to collect rental payments through-
out the pendency of the action. The lessee argued that the 
lessors had waived any breaches of the lease agreement by 
accepting rent while their action proceeded. However, the 
court disagreed, finding that the lessee was obligated to 
continue making rental payments as long as he remained on the 
leased premises. Id. The factual situation in the Fogel case 
is strikingly similar to that in the actions presently before 
this Court, and the same principle should apply. 
To accept the defendants-respondents' argument that 
the acceptance of rent waives all foregoing breaches of a lease 
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agreement as a matter of law would narrowly limit the choice 
of remedies available to a lessor faced with a lessee's 
breaches. The lessor would be left with the options of 
foregoing rent while filing suit to terminate the leasehold, 
or of accepting rent while suffering the consequences of the 
lessee's breaches without redress. The proposition is absurd 
on its face. 
A landlord is fully entitled to enforce the terms 
of a lease without requiring its termination. The injured 
lessor thus may file suit to require compliance with pro-
visions of a lease agreement or to secure an award of damages for 
the lessee's breaches while receiving payments of rent. 
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II. The trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment on Woodland's claims regarding the defendants-respondents' 
implied obligations under the lease agreement. In its 
complaint for breach of the lease and termination of the lease-
hold, Woodland alleges that the defendants-respondents 
breached the lease agreement by failing to operate the 
Woodland Drive-In Theatre in a prudent and businesslike 
manner. In addition to the fixed annual rental established 
in the lease agreement, ABC covenanted to pay an annual 
percentage rental of fifteen percent (15%) of the concession 
receipts above $65,000.00. (See Exhibit A, Paragraph 2.) 
The complaint avers and plaintiff-appellant will show, if 
allowed to proceed at trial, that defendants-respondents 
failed to fulfill their covenants to maintain and improve 
the theatre and, in fact, were grossly negligent in its 
maintenance and operation. The direct consequence of defen-
dants-respondents' manifold breaches of the lease agreement 
was to totally frustrate plaintiff-appellant's opportunity 
to realize the benefits intended from the percentage rental 
provision. 
Defendants-respondents moved for summary judgment 
respecting plaintiff-appellant's claims under the percentage 
rental provisions solely on the ground that as a matter of 
law a percentage rental provision does not give rise to any 
-19-
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duties on the part of the lessee respecting operation or 
maintenance of the theatre in order to produce revenue 
therefrom. In their motion, defendants-respondents do not 
attempt to demonstrate any uncontroverted facts concerning the 
activities of the parties in this case or their intent in 
subscribing to the subject provision of the lease. Defendants-
respondents make no attempt to demonstrate what the parties 
intended by the lease agreement nor to demonstrate that on 
the basis of the facts involved in this case, duties averred 
by the plaintiff-appellant could not have arisen. Defendants-
respondents' sole basis for the motion for summary judgment is 
the single proposition that as a matter of law a percentage 
lease provision does not give rise to the duties averred by 
plaintiff-appellant. 
Defendants-respondents' motion must fail for, 
inter alia, two basic reasons. First, the controlling authorities 
fail to support defendants-respondents' contention that, as 
a matter of law, percentage lease agreements do not give 
rise to duties concerning operation of and production of 
income from a leasehold. Second, the controlling authorities 
clearly hold that the duties attendent to a percentage lease 
agreement can only be ascertained by a determination of the 
intent of the parties and of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances. 
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The cases cited by defendants-respondents make 
it clear that in order to adjudicate the rights of a lessor 
under a percentage lease agreement, the court must make specific 
reference to the facts before it. Further, the only Utah case 
cited by defendants-respondents concerning a situation similar 
to that before the Court clearly demonstrates the Utah 
Supreme Court's embrace of the principle that a lessee under 
a percentage lease agreement may have substantive obligations 
concerning the operation of its business on the premises. 
In Flowers v. Wrights, 227 P.2d 768 (Utah 1951), the Court 
considered a claim by a lessor for additional rentals which it 
attributed to the business done by a sublessee. In this 
case, the lessee had agreed to pay a rental based upon a 
percentage of its total sales. At the time the lease was 
entered into, however, the Court held that the lessee was 
given the right to sublease and the parties contemplated 
that the sales of the sublessee would not be included within 
the terms of the percentage rental agreement. In discussing 
the legal standards applicable generally to a percentage 
lease situation, the court cited the case of Cissna Loan 
Company v. Baron, 149 Wash. 386, 270 P. 1022 (1928). The 
court stated that it did not disagree with the findings in 
the Cissna case but distinguished the case on the grounds that 
the lease before it specifically excluded the sales of the 
sublessee. 
-~-
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In the Cissna case a lessee occupied a building 
with rental consideration provided through a percentage 
of gross sales of a department store conducted by lessee in 
the building. After taking occupancy the lessee moved two 
important departments of his store to an adjoining building. 
The court held that the lessor was entitled to a percentage 
of the sales in those departments. 
In distinguishing the Cissna case, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that unlike the case before it, in the Cissna case 
there was no clear contemplation at the time of signing the 
lease that such a move of departments would take place. 
Comparing those facts to the instant suit, the parties clearly 
expressed the affirmative covenants which would have direct 
bearing on the gross percentage rental figure. This is not 
a case where a lessee has moved a department or moved an 
aspect of business. Rather, it is a case where the lessee 
has intentionally and negligently failed to fulfill the 
covenants of the agreement which have direct implication in 
the profitability of the business. Further, the Cissna case 
and the adoption of its principles in Flowers by the Utah 
Supreme Court clearly support the finding of obligations on 
the part of a lessee under a gross rental provision to conduct 
its business in good faith in order that the lessor has a 
fair opportunity to realize the benefit of that provision. 
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In this respect, it is important also to note that 
in Flowers v. Wrights, the Utah Supreme Court clearly stated 
that an intentional effort on the part of the lessee to 
reduce the percentage rental was clearly actionable. In this 
respect, the Supreme Court stated: 
Doubtless the reason why the lessee's right 
to sub-let space was so restricted was to 
prevent the lessee from using the right to 
sub-lease space as a device to reduce the 
percentage rental which would ordinarily 
accrue to the lessor. Numerous cases are 
cited by the plaintiffs to the effect that a 
lessee cannot use the authority to sub-let 
as such a device. With that principle we 
are in complete accord. 
The holding of the Utah Supreme Court is consistent 
with the standards embraced by Williston on Contracts, Rev. 
Ed., Vol. 1, § 104A, at 357: 
A third class of cases, not wholly inconsistent 
with the first, finds from the business 
situation, from the conduct of the parties, 
and from the startlingly disproportionate 
burden otherwise cast upon one of them, a 
promise implied in fact by the seller to 
continue in good faith production or sales, 
or on the part of the buyer to maintain his 
business or plant as a going concern and to 
take its bona fide requirements. In other 
words, this view implies an obligation to carry 
out the contract in the way anticipated, and not 
for purposes of speculation to the injury of 
the other party. 
Embracing the principle above-referenced, the Court 
in State Auto & Cas. Underwriters v. Salisbury, 494 P.2d 
529,531 (Utah 1972), stated: 
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Arising from what is commonly known and 
accepted as to the customs and experience 
in the everyday affairs of life, the parties 
each has the right to assume that the other 
will perform the duties he agrees to with 
reasonable care, competence, diligence and 
good faith, even though such terms are not 
expressly spelled out in the contract ...• 
See also Beaugureau v. Beaugureau, 463 P.2d 540, 542 (Ariz. 
1970); Coleman Eng'r Co. v. North Arner. Aviation Inc., 420 
P.2d 713, 720 (Cal. 1966); Miller v. Othello Packers, Inc., 
410 P.2d 33, 34 (Wash. 1966). 
In Flowers v. Wrights, however, the court clearly 
found that the good faith of the lessee had not been questioned 
in any respect. In this case, the lack of good faith of the 
lessee is the thrust of plaintiff-appellant's claims which 
are the subject of defendants-respondents' motion. 
Further, supportive of the Utah Supreme Court's 
finding are a substantial number of decisions from other 
jurisdictions which, in contravention to the findings of 
the cases cited by defendants, clearly impose upon a lessee 
under a percentage lease agreement obligations to fulfill 
the fair expectations of the lessor under that provision. 
In Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 
194 So. 579 (La. 1940), the Supreme Court of Louisiana held 
that a lessor stated a valid cause of action seeking additional 
rent under a percentage rental agreement complaining of lessee's 
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substitution of a store specializing in close-out sales of 
cheap brands and slow-moving old styles of shoes for a 
"high-class and fashionable store." 194 So. at 580. The 
lessor obviously intended that the lessee would maintain a 
quality merchandise shoe store on the leasehold premises during 
the lease term, but once again the ruling was made in spite of 
a minimum rental provision that had not been breached. 
In this case, at the time the lease was entered into, 
the clear intent of the parties was that the Woodland Drive-In 
Theatre would be profitably managed. Otherwise, the percentage 
rental provisions and the corresponding provisions for 
plaintiff-appellant's inspection of defendants-respondents' 
financial records would be meaningless. (See Exhibit A, 
Paragraph 2.) Paragraph 7 of the lease agreement expressly 
provides that the lessee is to approximately double the size 
of the snack bar-concessions area. After substantial delay, 
defendants built an addition to the snack bar but blocked 
it off with a cinder block wall and used it solely for storage. 
That action breached an express covenant of the lease agree-
ment as well as an implied covenant to run the theatre 
concessions in good faith in a businesslike manner. 
In Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 
7 So.2d 342 (Fla. 1942), the Supreme Court of Florida held 
that a lessee of a movie theatre was obligated to keep the 
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theatre operating all year and do its best to maximize 
revenues under a percentage rental agreement in light of 
a provision of the lease agreement requiring it to "use its 
best efforts to obtain and maintain the highest volume of 
business on the premises." This ruling was made despite the 
lessee's uncontested allegations that lessee "made improve-
ments on the theatre not required in the lease, that the 
theatre bus~ness . . . [was] seasonal and that the theatre 
was closed in the summer months in order to maintain a high 
standard of entertainment ...• " (7 So. at 343.) 
that the: 
In this case, the lease agreement expressly provides 
Lessee covenants to use and occupy said 
premises for the operation of a drive-in 
theatre business and any business which is 
usually incident thereto, and covenants 
and agrees to keep the improvements upon 
said premises, including all theatre 
equipment, in a good state of repair at the 
expense of the Lessee. (See Exhibit A, 
Paragraph B.) ---
Plaintiff-appellant has stated a valid cause of action 
for defendants-respondents' failure to operate the Woodland 
Drive-In Theatre in a prudent and businesslike manner. The 
defendants-respondents had an obligation to operate the theatre 
in good faith without allowing it to deteriorate. Defendants-
respondents have disregarded that obligation in their operation 
of Woodland Theatre, and the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to 
go to trial on the issue of damages arising from their failure 
to fulfill that obligation. 
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CONCLUSION 
In granting Plitt's motion for summary judgment, 
the trial court ignored the substantial issues of material 
fact raised by Woodland and relied erroneously on the overly 
broad propositions of law advanced by Plitt. Woodland is 
entitled to an adequate opportunity to prove its claims 
of forfeiture of the leasehold and to damages for the defendants-
respondents' breaches of the lease agreement. Such an 
opportunity was not given by the trial court, making no 
findings of fact relating to Woodland's claims. Plitt and 
ABC are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law in either 
of the plaintiff-appellant's actions, and this Court should 
accordingly reverse the trail court's summary judgment orders. 
~ 
DATED this ~day of May, 1976. 
BERMAN & GIAUQUE 
Daniel L. Berman 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Randall L. Dunn 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 33-8383 
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LEAS E 
--~~·THIS LEASE, made and entered ir\to at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
. ,this 9th_ day of March, 1971, by and between WOODLAND THEATP.ES, INC., 
~~~ration O-f Utah, hereinafter referred to as Lessor, and ABC i" 
INTERMOUNTAIN T~RES, INC., a corporation of the State of Dalaware, 
_duly qualified to do business in tltah, hereinafter referred to as 
·:Lesseer 
- .: , wrrNESSETH, that in consideration of the payment of the rent 
abd the keeping and performance of the covenants and agreements by 
~ said_ Lessee, "hereinafter set forth, the Lessor hereby leases unto 
the Lessee the following described premises situated in Salt Lake 
County, State of tltah: 
· ~~~- • Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block 
S, Ten Acre Plat "A", Big Field Survev, and running 
·-.;~::-:-':.thence South 0° 08' 26" West, 572.63 feet to the 
· Southeast corner of said Lot 8; thence South 89" 59' 
.-;:- ~~west 206.47 feet along the South line of said Lot 8 to 
., the Northeast corner· of Lot 16 A, Clearview Acre; Sub-
.. ~,. -division; thence South o• 12' 40" West, 18.00 feet to 
-- · • · the._Southeast corner of said Lot 16 A; thence North 89 • 
· 54' West, 100.00 feet to the- Southeast corner of said 
··Lot 16 A; thence South 89° 59' West, 100.00 feet to the 
- -.,, •.. Southeast corner of Lot 18 A, Clearview Acres Subdivision; 
.... - ••. thence North sa• 24' 50" West, 100.04 feet to the South-
- , west corner of said Lot la A; thence North 89" 02' 30" 
· West 100.01 feet to the Southwest corner of Lot 19 A, 
·. - .. · · Clearview Acres Subdivision; thence North 0° 12' 40" 
------- Ealit 13.30 feet to the Nortbwest corner of said Lot 19 A; 
-·-,thence South a9• 59' West, 160.00 feet to the Southwest 
·- corner of said Lot a, Bock 5, Ten Acre Plat "A"; thence 
'•· North o• 12' 40" East 573.07 feet to the Northeast· corner 
-- of said Lot 9; thence South a9• 59' East a9.30 feet; 
.-~,-~ <.:~hence along the arc of a 622.03' foot radius curve to 
the right, 715.24 feet to the point of beginning; said 
:-, 0;: ~c being subtended by a chord of South a9• 59' East, 676.48 
feet. And including a 50 foot right-of-way from the 
:.=:;.:.:J.eas.ed premises to Ninth East Street to serve as an 
entrance or exit from the Woodland Drive-In Theatre or 
a right-of-way of sufficient width to serve the purpose 
of an entrance or an exit to the Woodland Drive-In 
Theatre to Ninth East Street as required by law. 
Together with all the improvements thereon situated and 
all.appurtenances .thereto, including the swimming pool. 
Together with all of the equipment and personal property 
used in the operation of the Hoodland Drive-In Theatre, 
. as set forth in the attached Schedule marked Exhibit A • 
·. 
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1. The term of this lease shall commence on the 
day of -----------'' 1~71, and continue for fifteen (15) 
yea:s to and including 1986. 
2. ~~ Lessee cOvenants and agrees to pay as rental to 
the Lessor a minimum· annual guaranteed rental of Thirty-'rwo Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars ($32,500.00) per year during each year of the 
term of this Lease or any eXtension thereof. Except for the first 
year of the term of this Lease~ such minimum 'annual ·guaranteed rental 
shall be paid annually in twelve (12) monthly installments of Two 
I 
j.; 
.. ,1.-
.!: 
Thousand Seven Hundred Eigbt··.Dollars and Thirty-Three Cents ($2,708.33). 
Each installment shall be due on the first day of each month of each 
lease year, commencing with the first month of the second year of 
the te:rm of this Lease. The minimum annual guaranteed rental of 
I 
I I 
Thirty-'rwO Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($32,500.00) for the first 
year of the fifteen (15) year term of this Lease shall be paid by the 
Lessee to the Lessor within thirty (30) days after the cOIIU!Iencement 
date of this Lease. The parties acknowledge that the Lessor has 
already received Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000~00) of such 
Thirty-'rwO Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($32,500.00) prepaid minimum 
annual guaranteed rental and that the Lessee shall only be required to 
pay the Lessor an additional Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($7, 500. 00) within thirty (30) days from the commencement date of this 
Lease and upon the payment of such Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($7,500.00) the Lessee shall have fully prepaid th&~ minimum annual 
guaranteed rental of Thirty-'rwO Thcrusand Five Hundred Dollars 
.($32, 500.00) for the firs,t yeaz of the original fifteen (15) year term 
of this Lease. 
"- The Lessee, in addition, covenants and agrees to pay as a 
percentage rental to the t.e'ssor during each year of the term of this 
Lease, or ;my extension thereof: 
A. Fifteen percent .(15%) of the gross admission 
receipts, if any, of the Theatre in excess 
of One Hundred Eighty-Three Thousand Three 
Hundred and Thirty-Three Dollars ($183,333.00), 
. and 
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B. Fifteen percent (15%) of the gro~s concession 
receipts, if any, of the Theatre in excess 
of Sixty-Five Thousand· Dollars ($65,000.00). 
':he gross admission receipts and gross concession rece:'pts cf the 
~eatre upon which the determination of the percentage rental, if any, 
due under this Lease are to be computed, shall be calculated at the 
end of ~ach year of the term of this Lease and the amount ot percentage 
rental, if any, due the Lessor as percentage rental shall be paid by 
the Lessee without demand no later than thirty (30) days after the 
end of each such lease year. A written statement of gross admission 
receipts and of gross concession receipts, certified to be correct by 
a financial officer of Lessee, shall be jelivered by Lessee to Lessor 
within such thirty (30) day period regardless of whether any per-
centage rental is due under the Lease. 
The Lessee shall regularly keep proper books of account 
showing gross admission _receipts and gro.ss concession receipts from 
the Theatre, which books shall during regular business hours of the 
Lessee be open to the inspection of,Less:>r and its agents at Lessee's 
office in Salt Lake city, Utah. 
Gross admission receipts as used for purposes of this Lease 
shall mean the total receipts for admission to the Theatre, including 
all ticket sales, less any and all taxes and license fees applicable 
to such admission receipts required to be paid by any governmental 
authority, whether local, county, city, state or federal. 
Gross concession receipts as used for purposes of this Lease 
shall mean any receipts from the sale of concession commodities, 
j including snack bar sales; food·, candy, and soft drinks on the Theatre 
1· 
,_, 
premises, less any and all taxes and license fees applicable to any 
such gross concession receipts required to be paid by any governmental 
authority, whether local, county, city, state or federal. 
The Lessee in no way guarantees that there shall be any 
percentage rental earned and due and·payable under the terms and 
conditions. of this Lease. 
-3-
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Lease year·shall mean a period of twelve (12) consecutive 
calendar months during the term of this Lease, measured from the first 
day of the first full calendar month of the term of this Lease and 
. ending on the day prior to each anniversary of said first. day of the 
-fiXSt full calendar month. 
In addition to the annual financial statement with regard 
to gross admission receipts and gross concession receipts provided 
for above, the Lessee agrees to furnish Les~or with a quarterly 
statement of gross admission and gross concession receipts and shall 
make available for the Lessor's inspection the daily box office 
reports. 
3 •. 'l'he Lessee shall have thirty (30) days grace aild no 
.-1110re in which to pay any annual percentage rental payment to the 
Lessor from the date such rental payment is due under . Paraqraph 2 
I ' 4. 'l'he Lessor shall pay the general personal property and 
-re~l property taxes levied against"·the leased premises during the 
c.::::~-· -·· - -·- -term of this lease:,, provided, however, the Lessee agrees to pay any 
increase ~in-"t..Xes over and above the amount of the taxes for the 
s:-.:.~~ : . 
year 1963, which shall be levied during the term of the lease. Lessor 
. ;~~ ;. .:·~-- -
shall furnish to Lessee upon request a copy of each tax bill required 
: 't~ be paid (in part) by Lessee under this paragraph as well as a copy 
"""i:i£ 7fiie bill for the 1963 tax year-.-· 
s. Lessee agrees to pay all utilities, including water, 
~.heat, lights and sewer ~harge~ and Lessee also agrees to pay all 
c..~ty, county, state and federal licenses, or any licenses that may be 
imposed by any other governmental agency. 
6:- No paragraph 6. 
7. 'l'he Lessee covenants and agrees that the Lessee shall, 
within six (6) months from the date cif the effective date of this 
Lease enlarge the present snack bar to approximately doUble its present 
I·! If: 
' l l .. 
i: 
I 
I 
L 
. ~· 
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size. The Lessee shall be relieved. of the obligati0ns pursuant to 
this paragraph if zoning regulations prohibit the fulfilboent of such 
o~ligations or government approval for such construction cannot be 
obtained, but the Lessee and Lessor shall undertake to use their best 
efforts to obtain any zoning classification and any approval 
necessary to the fulfillment of their obligations. Lessee further 
covenants and agrees to move the existing marquee from its present 
·location to the northwest p~operty line of the demised premises on 
Seventh East and to situate such marquee. of such location so that both 
sides of the double marquee are ut.ilized to advertise the present 
at.;.:::a:oticr. · tc ;>rovide larger lamp houses, a.•d to oil and chip the 
de=sed pzemis.:s, all to be done prior tv Oecernbe:c 31, 1971. 
a. The Lessee covenants to use and occupy said premises for 
the operation of a; drive-in theatre business and any business which 
~"·~sually incident thereto, and covenants and agrees to keep the im-
provements upon said premises, inc·l-.:.ding all theatre equipment, in a 
good state·of repair at the expen~e of the Lessee. In this connection, 
tlie LE!ss.ee agrees to rep!.ace any equipment, at its expense, as such 
replacement shall become necessary in the proper and effective opera-
tion of the theatre business. Such replaced equipment shall be the 
' ~va:ie.nt to-, or better than, that which is replaced. The Lessee 
sba~~keep the premises free from all litter, dirt •. debris, and 
obstructions, and in a clean, sanitary condition, as required by all 
ordinan~e~ ·ru,a. health a·nd poli= regulations; nor shall said premises 
be used for any purposes which are unlawful, or which would render the 
~urance thereon void or the insurance risk more hazardous. At the 
expiration of the lease,' Lessee agrees to surrender possession to 
Le~sor of the said premises and the improvements and equipment upon 
said premises in a good state of :repair, ordinary wear and tear, 
acts of God, and damage~ o~ other insured casualty excepted. 
9. As a part of the co.1sideration of the ex.,cution of this 
Lease by ·Lessee, Lessor warrants that: Less·~r 1.s the owner of the 
iiJx,ve described real a rod personal property, and thai: if Lessee shall 
,, 
.i 
./ 
' :;
:' 
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perfor-m all the covenants of this Lease by said Lessee to be performed, 
U1e _Lessee shall and may peaceably and qui!!tly have, hold and enjoy 
'the said demised property for the full term aforesaid. 
.C::: :<:·-:.- ·., 10. ·The Lessee agrees that during the term of the lease 
the present name of the theatre shall not be changed, except that 
~~-see may indicate its operation of the theatre, provided such 
additional de~iqnation or de~cription shall be s~rdinate to the name 
i 
~oodland Drive-In Theatre; and the name "Park vu•, or any name other 
_!:han WoOdland, shall not be displayed in any marquee or signature 
~play in newspaper advertising. 
~ ,_.1;. 
11. The Lessee covenants and agrees that it will not assign 
- thia Lease or enter into any sublease of the premises or any part 
thereof, without tbe written consent of the Lessor, which consent 
Lessor agrees not to unreason~ly withhold, provided that the Lessee 
; : -.; r·_ ;. __ . : 
,.._~-~:(,~~iqn .t:his -~ease or ~~le~_the premises to a corporation in which 
-~ssee or _a parent or affiliated corporation owns the controlling 
'interest. In no event shall the assignment of this Lease relieve the 
\..".·- -·~; .. -. 
Lessee of its obligations to the Lessor hereunder. 
r~E::::- "':.•.: : • ;: __ :; ___ -- -- - ---- -. --- . 
tJ.c~. c:" ~;·.c12; ''liessee agrees to assume and perform any film contracts. 
<prev~ciusly negotiated by the Lessor or by the prior occupant which 
'iiiJ(not have been liquidated ·and performed prior to the commencement 
rc'late-of ·the term of this lease. Lessor represents that the only out-
cs·tanding unperformed film contract or contracts are as follows: 
In any event the foregoing shall apply only to film contracts with 
confirmed dates as of the commencement of the term of this Lease. 
I 
F 
;._ 
J.l 
. 
I 
~ f 
. ~ 
I • 
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13. In the event said leased property or any part thereof 
, ; be so damaged by fire or act of God that the same car.r10t be used for 
theatre purposes, the Lessor shall rebuild, repair or :replace the 
same at Lessor's expense, in s-..ch manner that tbe same sr.all be equal 
to said leased property prior to such damage. In the event said 
Lessor shall not commence said :repa:c:rs or replacements withi...• sixty 
(60) days following said damage, ant! thereafter J;>l:Oceeds l:herewith 
with due di.ligence, said Lessee, at Lessee's .election, may proceed to 
make said repairs or replacements and deduct the cost thereof and all 
reasonable expenses in connection the~ewith from the ensuing payments 
of rental re~~~=~d ~c be ~2de hereUIIde:r, or said Lessee, at Lessee's 
election, as· aforesaid, may terminate this lease. Said Lessee shall 
be relieved from making the :rental payments provided hereby during 
such part of the above-mentioned period as said premises shall be 
unfit for occupancy for theatre purposes, and also during such period 
as the theatres in the above City may be closed by the City, State or 
Federal authorities under Martial Law, Healt~ Quarant~ne, or oti1er 
emergency, and rentals paid in advance for such periods shal.l. be 
credited upon the ensuing rental pa)~ents to be made pursuant hereto. 
14. The Lessee agrees to maintain fire insurance with full 
extended coverage, including wind damage, at Lessee''s sole expense, 
to the extent of at least ac percent of the value of the equipment 
and improvements. The proceeds of such insurance shall be payable 
to the Lessor for the purpose of repair as aforesaid. In the event 
the proceeds of such insurance are insufficient to cover the replace-
ment cost, Lessee agrees to pay the difference of such replacement 
cost.: 
15. The Lessee. agrees to provide ana raaintair. public 
liability insurance for the protection of Less~r and Lessee, coverL>g 
the use and occupancy of the prern..1.ses by t·~.e Lesaee, in the sum of 
$100,000.00 for each person and $300,000.00 fo.c each occurrence, and 
Lessee covenants and agrees to save Lessor hannless from any liability 
of any kind vhich roay arise out of the use ru,d occupancy of the leased 
r 
P. 
I : ~. 
i. 
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16. Lessor grants unto Lessee the first right to purcr~se 
a marketable title to the demises premises at the same price and 
upon "t.'le same terms at which_ the same may be offered for sale to any 
r.!.:·. ·.: ~· . •' 
"citi1er prospective purchaser, subject to the te:cDS of this lease, and 
Leesee shall have thirty (30) days after notice of said proposed sale 
(6-!:, -~ . • • - • -
Within which to elect whether to purchase said premises. In .the event 
Lessee notifies Lessor, within the time specified above, of Lessee's 
'election to purchase said premiaes, then said purChase shall be 
consummated within fifteen (15) days after service of written notice 
upon Lessor of Lessee's election to purchase the same. 
1;~ The parties hereto agree that in the event of any 
litigatio~ between the parties hereto to enforce the terms of this 
.,:.-::-.::_ :. 
lease, or pertaining to the tenancy hereby created, the court may 
'\;.(-- t:. 
award the successful p~rty its reasonable attorneys' fees. 
"-- :... 
: (·~ -::-:. ~-·~a. ·All the covenants and agreements in this lease shall 
kx:tend to and be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, 
---· -· .... ,i,j~~essors·an.d-ass!gns.o£ flie~:=:re5pective part!es"hereto. 
~;J-~!··~=-:~~---~~;[-_f: :::: . .;~·:-c::.:::::~ ··:~ . .:.~:-~"i: :::.e -~-.:; • _:.~;:' -
. 20. The Lessor covenants and agrees that the Lessee may 
~~:.~;,:- -~:~'!~:> ~-: 
have an option to renew this lease under the same terms and conditions 
~-=:;.;-:.".. . -. . 
and at the same rental for a period of an ~additional five (5) years. 
E;f.•:c.~~-~.";:;;--... :-~i. · ----~-- ·· 
Notice of the intention to exercise this option must be given in 
"t:-.:: :· .. i.. ~ :: ••• 
'f"iting to the f.essor at least six _(6) months. before the expiration 
of this lease, otherwise. such "option shall terminate and be of no 
---
effect. 
21. The Lessor ·shall have the right to audit the books and 
records of the Lessee relating to ·the leased premises once each year 
in order to verify the accuracy of the reports made to the Lessor 
with respect to the gross receipts received by Lessee during each 
year of the term. 
-'8-
" 
i. 
' t·: 
. ' 
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22. :::.essee co"enants and agrees that it will promptly pay 
fCi'J: any i!nprovements or replacements of equipment made by Lessee to 
the end that no liens or repossessions occur. Title to a~ improve-
J;M!nts and equipment and replacements thereof shall be and rGnaL'l in 
the Lessor, and possession thereof, subject to reasonable wear and 
depreciation, shall be given to the Lessor upon the termination of 
.this lease for any cause. 
·23. At least sixty (6Cl) days prior to the expiration of 
this lease or the,exten5ion thereof, the Lessor shall have the right 
·to exhibit a sign for lease conspicuously on said premises as Lessor 
may desire, 'WitC.out seriously interfering with the operation of the 
theatre by the i:...:sse<!; and at any reasonable hour of the C3.y the 
Lessor, throu;h its appointed representative, shall have the right 
.tC?. enter upon, inspect and view the premises. 
C.• ---- • 
.24. (a) 'IllS>ef!:s.ea~~a~e~u.?>ilymeht~£"rent<Or 
· ·z,\ wcu.-aq~i-~~d...wlder...pa=g.raph....Z-for -tnirty-(3Fdays ·aftei-J ,-/' ;~~~~~n no.tice .specifying-the-defa~lt~--or7'{b)'=l:f:"!.esse<n:hat~il= t'! 
\ "l 'i@te:-canY-~ot:ber:payment:"requiredO.:he:i:eun<ler:-f'~hT~30~:'ay=afte:r::" 
~tet2ndtk~i~l:lie~ef~ or (c) if Lessee sha~ fail to 
perform any other obligation under this lease for l::.hirty (3:)) days 
.~fter written notice specifying the default (or within such period 
l.o . . · • . 
I 
Lessee has not commenced diligently to correct such default so specified 
"-..-.:. 
. ~r has not thereafter diligently pursued such correction to completion), 
j '\ ~ ~-.J.~~~ternebereof sbaJJ·; -,ac·~QR"·Of @±ef:q;y tlmQQ 
: -s,J y-~~- ~-ate-s~e~ifl~' in a. notic~ by ce:tified or .registered mai~lti,cllf 
1/j/ ~~~~- shaU not be less ~ t".m (10) days after the date of mailing ~ 
eu~•notic:e··by"I.essor"tO"~~~ be annulled and Less.:>r shall have, 
in addition to any other right or remedy Lessor may have at law or 
in equity, the right to thereupon re-enter and take possession of the 
said premises. 
~e specified remedies to which eith~r Landlord or Tenant 
may resort under the terms of thi.s lease are cumuJ.ative and are not 
intended to be exclusive of any •Jther remedies or m"'m~ of ,:edt·ess to 
., 
•· 
,;_ 
' J:l 
,., 
i:: 
~: 
,,; 
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which either may be lawfully entitled in case of any breach or 
~~re~tened breach by the other of ~y provision of this lease •. ~· 
erttnxe<o£aD'li~iiiii~~.....oi'..OOrewcase~. 
~rfotlllance·ot:a_mcof::ne..,..co-·enant""'""~~::w tv e-%i'iiii"'iiiijil 
Cuition:be'J"Ai"Cahntnen:Mal:J~Oiiiiiu-~ver;;nr;;r.., 
-- ··It is the intent of the parties that the number of notices 
and the time periods provided by the applicable statutes of the State 
of Utab shall not be increased or enlarged, and if Lessee is given 
the two (2) notice!! provided for in this Lease in order to annul this 
Lease, and the minimum time periods provided for in this Lease,~ 
~- &U&h.::IICJ;ic.u:::m_.;t-'suc:h-time-periods.-are ,g.iveno pwiLUAIJ.I~~....JI~ 
~'iiiff:me..~-ar .. Nbe:-tbe·notises-Pr2I.iisa··£o~ 
~-. 
~"7-.~ -- .:25. The Lessee shall make a surfacing applic:lltion during 
the summer of 1971 to the surfacing of tbe Woodland Drive-In Theatre 
of the same grade and quality as was applied to such surfacing in tbe 
S~r of 1967, and, thereafter, th8 Lessee shall make sucb applications 
£i~~'tk.e to d.me' as' ~e~d~d to keep and maintain the surfacing of the ~7-
--w~dland orive:..In :Theatre! in good condition. On or before ~~~ 
£ 007 F• ~~971, i.essee-shall purchase four hundred C400) new l, 000 
~~r~~;,;;- ~lec:tric heaters' with thermostatic: controls which shall 
~~-~~e- the property of Lessor as provided in paragraph 22 above. 
Lissor-shall pay Lessee half the cost of said beaters. 
::~ .-.:..· 
... 
Daniel B. Woodland, Eugene N. Woodland and Patricia 
l!~tc:hens, and any member of . the immediate family of said named persons, 
' shall have the right to use the swimming pool at any time, provided 
tl;lat such use wlll not interfere with the operation of the Lessee's 
business, and provided further that such use shall be at their awn 
risk: and the Lessor agrees to indemnify and save Lessee harmless 
from any claim, demand, or cause of action which may arise against 
the Lessee out of such use of the swimming pool by anyone named in 
this paragraph, or their immediate family and guests. 
I' 
I 
'· 
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27. Until further written riCt:~j atl~' notices or communi-
cations required or made pursuant to this Lease shall be directed 
~tere<EP~itJ:i!e'd'?ma.Iij(Jas folla-1s: 
.-To the Lessor: To Daniel B. Woodland 
755 East 4070 South 
Murray 7, Utah 
To the Lessee: Tii:'.l\Bc::IntEUJ!IOUlltaU.~e~.W.~r~. 
. 6.4:-.Wes_j;_SJ:u::.:m<LSou\:hoooi 
CSalt--J.ate....C~al>--'-84-~ 
1Withca;=sec~m¢•c·op~s~4' 
~-!>,meri c;.=.::Jrr&ac~apan:.ea~;:>:rrl!'. 
4'\.t'l:: .;..:.J:.egal.-CO".ms.eJ...;s; 
~~330_ Avenue __ of ...J;llio~J::.i=s;.;f' 
~ork...c.i::y,-N........,..orl• ·l.OOlW 
26. The Lessee shall repaint the Woodland Drive-In Theatre 
screen during the summer of 1971, and thereafter as needed during the 
term of the lease or any renewal thereof but not less than once every 
four (4) years • 
29. The Woodland Drive-In Theatre shall not be expanded 
on additional property or any entrance or exit added other than the 
Ninth East entrance and exit, or any entrance or exit discontinued 
without the Lessor's written permission. 
30. Eugene N. Woodland may have a right-of-way over the 
Ninth East exist and entrance for access to and from the property 
owned by him which adjoins on the south of said entrance and exit. 
31. The Lessor and the individual stockholders thereof 
(Daniel B. Woodland and Eugene N. Woodland) agree· to assist and 
cooper~te in every necessaiy and cdesirable way with the Lessee to 
obtain all necessary zoning and other permits for use of the Ninth 
East exit and entrance wa":( and for all other improvements provided 
in thi.s lease. 
32. Neither Lessor nor its individual stockholders will 
erect or permit to be erected on any.Froperty whicn they may own 
adjacent to the Woodland Drive-In 'rhe2 tre any flashing or revvlving 
lights which wil! in any way interfere with the viE<W of 'cl1e pa'i:rt)ltS 
·'' 
·t· ~ ! : :r 
Jl: 
iti ,., 
i! 
"' j:l 
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of the theatre watching the pic~ure on the. screen at the theatre, 
_an~:they will not cause or permit any loud or unuspal noises in 
connection with the use of such adjoining property which will inter-
_fere with the operation of said drive-in theatre, 
33. The Lessor and Lessee agree to execute a short form ; 
,, 
' I of lease, acknowledged and otherwise in proper form for recording 
pursuant to the Statutes of Utah, pertaining thereto, This short form 
shall recite (a) the date of the execution of the lease; (b) the 
-!: 
. j 
description of the premises demised by the lease; (c) the term of the 
lease; (d) the right of extension or renewal; and (e) the first right 
to purchase a marketable title to the demised premises. The original 
executed copy of said short form lease shal.l be recorded and shall be 
.returned, after ::recording, to Lessee. 
--· -- 34 •. ~'or31tani:m.W....~-gb~~-t~~~-Jlil~!~ .. :l;~leasl!;f 
Sriui"'t:ima~En¥tne::~~~'~"~4w 
QPndit.icms. 'Of/ 
c.:. <.: ~· -.- · •• - •• .. A •.. Lessor shall have received an offer from a 
third party to purchase the premises for use 
:::.;.-:.:-. ::~c·. ·.::·'::·r:>:.::other than as a motion picture drive-in 
theatre; 
B. Lessee shall have been given notice thereof 
and the first right to purchase pursuant to 
_,_. :·c:·:paragraph 16 of the lease and Lessee shall 
have failed to elect to purchase; 
···-· ·. : -· · ... : ... :c.-· Le5sor~shaU have qiven Less.ee"n'O~s~.;t~ 
hinety (90) days advance written notice of'f 
the effective date of such terrnination, __ buj::f 
the effective date shal.l in no event be .. 
--· :-~.-., ~ing...the-period..July-1 through.Labor Dayr 
·:.D. Lessor shall pay to Lessee (1) a sum equal 
to twice the amount of Lessee's investment 
in the woodland Drive-In Theatre, which 
.shall include, without limitation, the 
: .. -=.,:c.$125,000.00 paid by Lessee for the lea~e-
' hold assignment, the cost of heaters, 1f 
any, and the cost of expanding the snack 
bar, plus (2) if the effective da~e of/ 
termination be within the first bve (5.) . 
years of .. tl1e __ .fifteen (15) year extendecLted. 
. an...amount as follows: 
..;.· 
... 
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Termination Date 
During 
1st year 
2nd year 
3rd ;,.·ar 
·.·· 4th year 
5th year 
Added Amount 
25% of 2mount under 
20% of amount under 
15% of amount U."'lder 
10% of amount under 
5% of amount under 
(1). 
(1). 
Ill. 
(1). 
(1). 
In addition, Lessor shall return to Le~aid 
rent, including the security deposit~hich would \\ 
otherwise be applied to rent for thr:l.ast year. . } 
' f-,·.,,,--,(l:IIJ)_ / ~·;.:.7 
IN ~5 WHEREOF, the Lessor, Wood .d Tl:.eatre?, Inc., and 
~ 
the Lessee, ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc., have each exe~lted this 
Lease by their duly authorized officers and attached their seals the 
day and year first above written. 
A'l'TEST: . WOOtLAND THEATRES, INC. 
~ I ' 
.. 
~· 
r ~ . 
! .. 
. Jt2-;i ~Jutt-d By t...r:;?., <'" 
Its "' 
' .~~ --;::,.(_~/ (/.( 
~--
. - _,." 
ABC INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES , INC • 
, ,./1 ~--·~-By-_~. ~1/ 
I I~.~~~~~~~--~-
. · ... 
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